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متجاوز
Deterrence can be practiced by denying a potential aggressor pathways to conduct an attack successfully, through defensive measures that credibly deny a potential aggressor its objectives, or by threatening severe punishments if it does engage in aggression.
Deterrence by denial strategies seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives-deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example.3 At their extreme, these strategies can confront a potential aggressor with the risk of catastrophic loss.
Most classic studies suggest that denial strategies are inherently more reliable than punishment strategies.5 Steps taken to deny, such as placing significant military capabilities directly in the path of an aggressor, speak loudly and clearly.
An aggressor might doubt, on the other hand, a defender's willingness to impose punishments.6 An aggressor might also convince itself that the defender will hesitate to follow through on threats to punish because of attendant risks, such as further escalation, that the deterring state may not be willing to run once the moment arrives.7 As Thomas Schelling noted, there are threats that a state would rather not fulfill, and weakness in deterrence can emerge when an aggressor believes the defender will ultimately prove unwilling to carry out its threats.8
This is partly true for military operational reasons: It is more difficult to deny an attack far from home, a mission that demands the projection of military force sometimes thousands of miles away and often much closer to the territory of the aggressor state.
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