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Pluralism, Economic Analysis, and Conventionalism This section considers three untidy questions that we should address as we reach the end of this study.
216 elements of contract interpretation who do normative economic analyses of contract law, such as Schwartz and Scott, pursue such monism.35 Their criticism in effect insists that Eisenberg should transform his pluralism into monism if his theory is to compete well with an efficiency theory.
Pluralism in contract law can be somewhat messy, as is democracy.
So we are led to pluralism.
Weight thus is internal to the congeries of relevant legal reasons in each case: The weight of one reason depends on the weight of the other reasons.39 As a result, weighing the reasons often requires discretion to do justice under the law in cases.40 There is nothing wrong with discretion in adjudication when it is justified by a pluralism of applicable normative and other proper considerations, and a meta-norm for assigning weights is absent.41 This endorsement of weighing indicates the response to arguments that [f]or any given maxim [of contract interpretation] that would persuade a judge to a certain conclusion a contrary maxim may be found that would persuade him to the opposite (or contradictory) conclusion.42 This would be true only if one assumes that each single rule or canon of interpretation is supposed to determine the right result in a case on its own.
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